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The Smart TV is becoming increasingly popular amongst consumers. Many consumers use
a Smart TV to gain quick access to the Internet including video on demand, social
networking and instant messaging. Most Smart TVs also provide capabilities to connect
with external devices such as a USB ﬂash drive, a mobile phone etc. All of these features
make a Smart TV a potentially rich source of information for forensic purposes. With
increasing utilisation, it is also easier for malicious users to abuse a Smart TV. Therefore a
digital forensics study on the ﬁeld of Smart TV is imperative. This paper proposes new
procedures for acquiring, analysing and investigating a Smart TV.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Electronic technology continues to develop. Each day
new electronic devices that inﬂuence human daily life are
entering the market. These devices may store digital data
which may be interesting from a digital investigation
perspective. A Smart TV (Wikipedia, 2014) is one of these
devices. A Smart TV, sometimes referred to as connected TV
or hybrid TV, describes a trend of integration of the Internet
into television sets and set-top boxes, as well as the tech-
nological convergence between computers, television sets
and set-top boxes. Smart TVs are available as stand-alone
products, but regular televisions can also be made
“smart” through set-top boxes that enable advanced func-
tions; for example, Google TV, Apple TV. These devices are
mostly IP devices, which enable streaming content over
Internet without the need for cable or satellite. Most of the
Smart TVs provide access to external hard drives, digital
cameras, mobile phones or Internet applications. A Smart
TV allows the viewers to connect to the Internet andoztas), r.riethoven@
M. Roeloffs).
ier Ltd on behalf of DFRWSbrowse the web as on a computer without the need for
additional peripherals. Smart TVs include a wide range of
applications which can be used for different means.
Viewers can use applications to search and ﬁnd videos,
music, photos and other content on the web, a local cable
TV channel, a satellite TV channel or a local storage device.
In the digital forensic area, questions arise as towhether
a Smart TV should be an important component of a digital
investigation. In the article (Sutherland et al., 2014) a
number of questions are posed concerning the relevance of
the Smart TV in a digital forensic investigation: do Smart
TVs retain and contain relevant information? How easily is
this data accessed? In Mutawa et al. (2012) it is stated that
the increased use of social networking applications on
smartphones makes these devices a ‘‘goldmine’’ for
forensic investigators. Is the use of, for example, social
networking applications on Smart TVs doing the same for
forensic investigators?
This paper presents research on extracting and ana-
lysing digital data from a Smart TV in a forensically sound
manner. It will give a complete guide to acquiring and
investigating data on a Smart TV. This paper does not
present an in-depth study of the inner workings of a Smart
TV. The scope of this research focuses only on the methods
of extracting data from a Smart TV and the global analysis. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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TV may indeed contain different kinds of digital traces
which can be relevant for investigations, such as, pictures,
connected devices, visited websites, etc. If forensic exam-
iners are not knowledgeable regarding the different types
of Smart TV based systems and what artifacts each may
leave behind, they could miss critical information during an
investigation.
Related work
Earlier work on Smart TVs focuses mainly on gaining
access to the Smart TV in order to get user data remotely
(Grattaﬁori and Yavor, 2013) and (Lee and Kim, 2013). The
latter authors also go further into making a surveillance
device from the Smart TV, by recording audio and video
from the built-in microphone and camera respectively. The
main point made in the previous research is that it is not
that hard to ﬁnd ways to gain access to the Smart TV on a
low-level. With these methods it should be possible to gain
access to a Smart TV. There is no forensic research available
for any brand or model of Smart TV.
From a hardware perspective, the Smart TV is just an
embedded system with a large (for example 40-inch)
screen. The Smart TV can be handled like any embedded
system. An embedded systemwhich has been investigated
thoroughly is amobile phone.Willassen (2005) and van der
Knijff (2010) show methods which can be used during the
investigation of a Smart TV.
Materials and methods
In this section we will explain how we carried out
this research. Initially, a literature and market share
survey was conducted. The Smart TV market continues
to grow (Tarr, 2013) and expand rapidly in major coun-
tries (Hong, 2013). We determined which models and
brands of Smart TV are popular (Top10, 2014) or more
common under users and which functionality of these
Smart TVs are commonly used. On the basis of this
literature study, the model and type of the Smart TV for
our research was selected. Secondly, we set up an
experimental environment to generate different types of
digital traces when using the Smart TV. Finally methods
were developed to acquire and analyse the digital traces
of this Smart TV.
Selecting a smart TV
As previously stated, there exists a great deal of va-
riety of types and models of Smart TVs on the market.
The features available on a Smart TV vary depending on
the brand and model of TV. Most Smart TVs will allow
access to popular social networking sites and communi-
cation programs such as Skype. The most popular brands
of Smart TV are Samsung, LG, Panasonic and Sony. This
research was conducted on a Samsung television model
UE40F7000SLXXN, based on popularity, the fact that it
contains a camera and microphone, and the fact that
Samsung has an open source platform for their Smart
TVs. The Samsung Smart TVs are very popular amongstcustomers and offer a great deal of functionality which
therefore may leave relevant digital traces for a digital
investigation. This type of television allows the viewer to
install applications, visit websites, peruse pictures,
communicate by voice and video, connect external de-
vices, etc. User data was generated by performing
different usage scenario's which covered most of the
available functionality of the Samsung Smart TV.
Data acquisition methods
The selected Smart TV uses ﬂash memory as storage.
The ﬂashmemory on the investigated Smart TV is an eMMC
chip (Wikipedia MultiMediaCard, 2015). Depending on the
hardware, there are several options to acquire data. The
following methods for acquiring the data were utilised:
 eMMC ﬁve-wire method: an eMMC chip, like the one
used in our reference Smart TV only needs ﬁve signals to
be connected: Vss, Vdd, Clock, Command&Data0. These
signals were detected on the main board. It is then
possible to read the eMMC chip using a standard USB
SD-cardreader attached to a writeblocker.
 NFI Memory Toolkit II (MTK II): (NFI, 2011) this is a
universal forensic solution that enables investigators to
read memory chips and potentially extract user data e
such as text messages, phone numbers, pictures and
browser history e from a wide variety of devices. The
MTK II is a combination of hardware and software. The
hardware makes a physical connection, generates sig-
nals and supplies power to a memory chip, while the
software runs the necessary command-sets to access
data in the various types of memory chips.
 Application: a software approach for acquiring data is
the use of a custom application with a small footprint
which was installed on the Smart TV andwrites the data
out to an external storage device. This might be possible
as Samsung distributes a Software Development Kit to
develop applications for this particular model of Smart
TV.
Analysis of digital traces
The fundamental goal of this research is to determine
which digital traces are left behind on a Smart TV for
investigation purposes. This means that this paper is not a
complete description of the inner workings of this partic-
ular Smart TV and instead is focused on acquiring traces of
user interaction. Different tools and forensic programs like
EnCase were used to search through the data of the Smart
TV. Our research was focused on the following types of
traces which may well be relevant for a digital forensic
study:
 System information and settings: device name, con-
nected devices, network information and smart
functions.
 Apps: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.
 Web browsing: visited websites, traces of search en-
gines, etc.
 Photo and multimedia ﬁles
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ﬂash drive, harddiscs, etc.
 E-mails and appointments
 Cloud services: Dropbox and OneDrive
 Channel information: which channels are viewed.
Data acquisition
eMMC ﬁve-wire method
On the main board of the Samsung Smart TV, the ﬁve
necessary signals were detected in order to use the ﬁve-
wire method and extract data from the eMMC chip. It
was not possible to make a copy of the eMMCmemory. This
is probably due to the fact that the processor is also trying
to access the memory. It was not possible to reset or halt
the processor, because reset points were not found. It was
also not possible to put the Smart TV into a speciﬁc mode,
in order to prevent the processor from accessing the
memory. For this speciﬁc brand and model Smart TV the
ﬁve-wire method did not work.NFI memory toolkit
The next option was to desolder the ﬂash memory and
read it with the MTK II.
Fig. 1 depicts the main board of the Samsung Smart TV.
The white square emphasises the location of the memory
chip of the Smart TV.Fig. 1. Main board.The memory chip of the Samsung model
UE40F7000SLXXN is a Samsung KLM4G1FE3B-B00, which
is a 4GiB MoviNAND ﬂash chip. MoviNAND is the trade-
marked name for Samsung's eMMC chips. By utilising a
(hot air) rework station, the memory chip was removed
from the main board (Breeuwsma et al., 2007). The MTK II
was then used to make an image of the memory chip.Application
Due to the fact that data acquisition by chip extraction is
very specialised and destructive, a software method was
investigated. A hacking community (SamyGo, 2014) has
already made progress in this area. The SamyGO Forum
describes a method to ‘root’ a Samsung Smart TV (SamyGo
Forum, 2013b). Rooting is needed to obtain elevated priv-
ileges for an application that runs on Linux for ARM oper-
ating system installed on this Smart TV. Without elevated
privileges, it is not possible to extract data from the user
space memory or have full access to the ﬁle system. The
rooting procedure is as follows:
1. Install the Skype App from the Samsung App store.
2. Start the Skype app and ensure Skype is set to autostart,
before closing it.
3. Install the SamyGO widget.
(a) Download the SamyGO_usb widget.
(b) Place the SamyGO folder on a USB ﬂash drive.
(c) Navigate to “more apps” and insert the USB ﬂash
drive.
(d) Start the SamyGO widget.
By examining the code in theMain.js ﬁle of the SamyGO
widget, it is derived that a ﬁle patch was unzipped in the
Skype folder. The patch ﬁle is a zip ﬁle with the contents:
 AutoStart
 libSkype.so
 remoteSamyGO.zip
 runSamyGO.sh
The ﬁle libSkype.so overwrites the current ﬁle, and is
started by Skype at the startup of the Smart TV. This lib-
Skype.so in turn starts the script runSamyGO.sh, which in-
stalls busybox and initiates an ftp server. With the added
functionality of an ftp-server on the rooted Smart TV it is
possible to transfer data.
With changes to the SamyGO shell script, it is possible to
make images of the complete ﬂash memory from the Smart
TV. The script runSamyGO.shwas modiﬁed, so that it would
start another script (run1.sh), which installs a busybox
instance into the /tmp/bin directory and uses the dd com-
mand from the busybox to create an image. During this
imaging process the data is written to a USB ﬂash drive
which is inserted into the Smart TV.
This software method is vulnerable to updates of the
ﬁrmware of the Smart TV. As (Grattaﬁori and Yavor, 2013)
show, security researchers are also targetting the Smart TV
operating systems. During our research the ﬁrmware was
automatically updated to a newer version. The root method
Table 2
Samsung eMMC chip oriented File System.
Label Start sector Size in bytes
p14 56,544 3,145,728
p15 62,704 3,145,728
p16 68,864 157,286,400
p21 3,448,144 104,857,600
p22 3,652,960 157,286,400
p23 3,960,176 10,485,760
p24 3,980,672 1,870,979,072
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cation was rendered useless. For other models of Samsung
Smart TVs this method might still be working and the
SamyGO userbase might overcome this problem in the
future by releasing an updated version or method. As (Lee
and Kim, 2013) shows there will be more methods of get-
ting software access to the Smart TV, but it will take work
for each brand and model of TV. It will always be an arms
race between the makers of exploits and the Smart TV
manufacturers who will repair these exploits. Therefore,
the hardware methods for getting access to Smart TVs will
be more lasting and forensically more sound than the
software methods.
File system analysis
As described in the previous section, data can be suc-
cessfully acquired from the Smart TV using two different
methods. Each of these methods results in an image which
can be analysed with both standard tools and speciﬁc
forensic tools. In this section the results of the image
analyse are presented.
The image from the 4 GiB ﬂashmemory contains in total
24 partitions. It uses a standard DOS partition scheme
(Carrier, 2005, p. 81e84) with four primary partitions. One
of the primary partitions is an extended partition con-
taining 20 logical partitions. All partitions, except the
placeholder extended partition, have a hex byte 83 stan-
dard Linux identiﬁer (Carrier, 2005, p. 90). Based upon a
signature identiﬁcation of the content within the partition,
at least two different ﬁle system images were discovered.
Table 1 lists the partitions containing a Squash File System
image (SquashFS) and Table 2 lists the partitions with the
proprietary Samsung eMMC chip oriented File System
(eMMCfs). In Table 3 u-boot images are listed that were
discovered.
The acquired dd image and the MTK II eMMC storage
area image are both equal in size. However, besides the
standard eMMC storage area, the MTK II also acquired the
Boot area and Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) area
from the chip in separate image ﬁles.
SquashFS
The SquashFS, which is intended to be a read-only ﬁle
system, is not viewable with the standard squashfs-tools
(Lougher, 2014). Samsung made its own changes to
squashfs-tools version 4.2. This version (squashfs4.2.tar.gz)
can be downloaded from Samsungs Open Source Release
Center (Samsung, 2014), in the TV/DTV/ETC section. WithTable 1
SquashFS ﬁle system, little endian, version 4.0.
Label Start sector Size in bytes
p8 19,536 5,767,168
p10 45,168 5,767,168
p17 376,080 367,001,600
p18 1,092,896 367,001,600
p19 1,809,712 419,430,400
p20 2,628,928 419,430,400this program it is possible to unsquash the ﬁle system
thereby exporting all content. Loopback mounting a Sam-
sung SquashFS image is possible when applying the
modiﬁcation Samsung made to SquashFS for a given Linux
kernel.
In the unsquashed partition p17 we found a text ﬁle
partitions.txt (see Fig. 2) which lists more information about
the used partition schema. This ﬁgure however lists 25
partitions instead of the previous found 24. One partition
with the size of 524,288 bytes is missing in our 4GiB im-
ages. Because partition p1 is zero-ﬁlled in the dd image, we
assume that this is the RPMB and p0 is the Boot area.
Further research on the Boot area and RPMB acquired with
theMTK II should be conducted to support this assumption.Samsung eMMC chip oriented ﬁle system
The eMMCfs is a proprietary ﬁle system made by Sam-
sung. In order to investigate the contents of the partitions
with this type of ﬁle system, speciﬁcationswere needed. On
most of their Smart TVs, Samsung uses VD GNU/Linux,
which is an open source Linux distribution by the VD
Project (2014). Our particular Smart TV uses this distribu-
tion of Linux on its ARM processors. In the source code of
this operating system, found in Samsung (2014) in the TV/
DTV/LED section with the name 13_UNxxF7200.zip, the
Linux ﬁle system drivers for eMMCfs were found. These
sources can be compiled for any Linux-based operating
system. Depending on the version of the Linux kernel, a
user wanting to include native support for eMMCfs can do
so. On the SamyGO forums (SamyGo Forum, 2013a) users
have already made some patches for different kernel ver-
sions which can be used, or an expert user can use the
sources from Samsung and incorporate them into their
Linux distribution.U-boot legacy uImage
U-Boot is a universal bootloader that is used to boot
devices. This particular bootloader has comprehensive
support for loading and managing boot images. The bootTable 3
u-boot legacy uImage (Linux 3.0.33, Linux/ARM OS Kernel Image).
Label Start sector Size in bytes
p7 5184 7,340,032
p9 30,816 7,340,032
Fig. 2. File partitions.txt.
Fig. 3. System information.
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are signed by Samsung. This is used to prevent the Smart
TV from booting other type of images, unless the security is
broken.
Partition redundancy
As seen in Fig. 2, a number of partitions have the same
size, some of which have the same bitwise content. Refer-
ence p2 is short for /dev/mmblk0p2, henceforth the parti-
tions that have the same content are p2 þ p3, p5 þ p6,
p7 þ p9 and p8 þ p10. This is most likely to enable the
resetting of the Smart TV to factory settings or in the event
of an unsuccessful software or ﬁrmware upgrade, it may be
reverted to a previous version.
Analysis of digital traces
In this section, digital traces contained in the ﬁle system
of the Smart TV will be analysed. For clarity partition ref-
erences in this section are also based on the partition
schema depicted in Fig. 2 shortened to p<number>.
System and network information
The Samsung Smart TV provides functionality to display
information about the Smart TV itself. Fig. 3 shows an
example of information that is displayed by the Smart TV.
First this functionality was used to display information
about the Smart TV and then ﬁles were searched thatcontained this information. Experiments show that infor-
mation is redundantly stored in multiple ﬁles on the Smart
TV. The following ﬁles contain information about serial
number, model name, device ID of Smart TV.
 p16/dlna_web_root/dmr/SamsungMRDesc.xml
 p16/dlna_web_root/rcr/RemoteControlReceiver.xml
 p16/dlna_web_root/MainTVServer2/
MainTVServer2Desc.xml
 p16/dlna_web_root/rcr/dialreceiver.xml
For example; a part of the ﬁle SamsungMRDesc.xml ﬁle
contains the following information:
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ware version:
 p17/infolink/manager/versionﬁle
 p24/common/WidgetMgr/mgrinfo.datNetwork information
The Samsung Smart TV provides functionality to display
network information, as seen in Fig. 4. Network related
information was found to be stored in the following ﬁles:
 p16/network/network_tv_name: information about TV
name on network
 p16/network/network_wfd_conﬁg: information about
port numbers
 p16/wfd_rtspsource: information about IP-address
 p16/Bluetooth_Dev_info: information about paired
bluetooth devices
 p24/common/WidgetMgr/network.info: the MAC-
address of the ethernet portApps activity
Experiments show that information about installed
apps is saved in the subdirectory widgets which is located
on the root of p24. The subdirectory widgets contains two
subdirectories, which are named User and Normal. The sub-
directory User contains information about apps which have
been manually installed by the user. The subdirectoryFig. 4. Network information.Normal contains information about apps which were
installed from the Samsung App Store. The following ﬁles
and subdirectories contain relevant information about the
applications:
 p24/common/WidgetMgr/info.xml: information about
installed apps on Smart TV
 p24/common/11111000001/_sfdata.json: information
about the installation date of apps
 p24/common/WidgetMgr/history.xml: historic infor-
mation about paths in which pictograms from the last
used apps were saved.
 p24/history/capture: a folder containing low resolution
screenshots from the last used apps, which are named
with the identiﬁer number of the app. The corre-
sponding identiﬁer number is also saved in a ﬁle which
is called history.xml located in the root folder history.
This means that the Samsung TV takes a screenshot
from the running app with content. The number of
screenshots, when a screenshot is being made and their
longevity has not yet been determined.
 p16/SOCIAL: a directory about social media related apps,
containing for each social media related app, one sub-
directory with an abbreviation of the app name. For
example: SOCIAL/FB contains information about Face-
book app or SOCIAL/TW contains information about
Twitter
In order to illustrate the type of information gain from
these ﬁles, a part of the ﬁle _sfdata.json is included:
Web browsing activity
While conducting our research, it was discovered that
all relevant Internet traces were kept in SQLite databases.
This database is the ﬁle settings.db in partition p24 in the
sub-directory webkit/WebBrowser. This database contains
14 tables. Below the tables which contain relevant infor-
mation are listed:
 FullBrowserHistory: contains information about the
URL, title, count and visited date. During this investi-
gation it was determined that VisitDay was always 1970
and was not updated to the actual date and time.
 fullBrowser_HiddenHistory: contains only the name of
visited websites without additional information
 fullBrowser_Bookmark: contains information about
websites which are bookmarked
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gines. For example google, bing
Fig. 5 depicts an example of a table as found in
settings.db.
Pictures, audio and video ﬁles
The ﬁle .CM.db which is located on the root of partition
p22, contains information about audio, picture and video
ﬁles as well as other speciﬁc information such as when
these ﬁles were opened, played etc. This ﬁle is also an
SQLite database and contains 20 tables. Below are the
relevant tables:
 PhotoTable: name and EXIF information of the picture
 MusicTable: name of the ﬁle, media information such as
artist, genre etc.
 VideoTable: name of the ﬁle, title, container type etc.
 FileTable: media ﬁles which were opened. The sub-
directory p22/Recently Played contains ﬁles with the
.mta extension. According to information on (File
Extensions, 2014) these ﬁles are Samsungs AllShare
ﬁles and they can contain thumbnails. During this
research it was not possible to view these ﬁles.
Fig. 6 shows an example of a table as found in the
database .CM.db.
External media artifacts
The ﬁle device0013.dbwhich is located in the root of p22
contains information about USB ﬂash drives that have been
connected to the Smart TV. This ﬁle is an SQLite database
and contains one table TABLE_DEVID. Fig. 7 shows the
ﬁelds of this table. During this research it was not possible
to determine with experiments why the database ﬁle is
called device0013.db. There are no ﬁles numbered 0 through
12 or higher found (for example device0015.db).
TV channels
The following ﬁles contain information about television
channels.Fig. 5. Example table p16/map-AirA, map-AirD, map-CableA, map-CableD,
map-SateD; These ﬁles contain the names of channels
for analogue and digital terrestrial, cable or satellite
connections.
 p22/.EPG.db; This is an SQLite database and contains the
Electronic Program Guide. The tables contains TV pro-
gram broadcast information. Fig. 8 shows as an example
of the schema of a table in this ﬁle.
Cloud artifacts
During this research of cloud services, databases that log
http and https requests were found. The following data-
bases relate traces to cloud services:
 p24/webkit/database/snapshot/WebpageSnapshots.db.
Fig. 9 shows an example of a table in this ﬁle.
 p24/webkit/localstorage/StorageTracker.db
 p24/webkit/WebBrowser/settings.db
 p16/UDBCOMMON.
Conclusion
This paper presents the possibilities to perform a digital
forensic investigation on a Smart TV. The results of this
research will be of importance to forensic investigators, as
well as in criminal investigations and civil litigation
matters.
It is important to understand that malicious users can
abuse a Smart TV for criminal purposes such as viewing
child pornography, communication with other criminals,
botnet, etc. The Smart TV can be a member of a home
network and can contain traces and information about
other digital equipment or computers at a crimescene.
Therefore forensic investigators have to realise that a Smart
TV may contain relevant information. In the future we
expect that the Smart TV will also be a major component in
the ﬁeld of digital forensics.
This research has shown that it is possible to make a
copy of data from a Smart TV for forensic investigation
purposes. Section Data acquisition contains two methods
for data collection from a Smart TV, an application and the
NFI Memory Toolkit II. We expect the chip-off method, in
combinationwith the MTK II, to continue towork for Smartfrom settings.db.
Fig. 6. Example table from .CM.db.
Fig. 7. Example table from device0013.db.
Fig. 8. Example table from .EPG.db.
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possible to ﬁnd other ways whichwill always work. The de-
soldering is also the best forensically sound method to
make a copy of a device. With this method, no data is
changed during the acquisition process.
The use of this method has also some disadvantages.
The desoldering process needs to be done with speciﬁc
equipment and there is also a risk that the process willFig. 9. Example table from Wdamage the Smart TV. This method cannot be performed
on-site. This research also explored the collection of data
via these methods and determined that ﬁle contents were
not altered by the use of the NFI Memory Toolkit. An
application can only be used in cases where it is not
possible to extract the chip from the TV. Due to the
installation of this application on a Smart TV, the original
state of data will be changed. The change of data is in someebpageSnapshots.db.
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the directory where the application ﬁles are stored during
installation. But the problem with an embedded system
which runs an operating system is that the operating sys-
tem will always change data in the memory/ﬁle system
when an embedded system is running such as log ﬁles. So it
is not always feasable to determine all the conditions for an
embedded operating system that cause changes in data.
Forensic examiners know that every type of digital
equipment can contain artifacts of digital data that may be
interesting for their case. In practice a great deal of digital
equipment is still being overlooked. The analysis of ac-
quired data from the Smart TV shows that a Smart TV also
contains relevant digital artifacts for digital forensic pur-
poses, and that this data is easily acquired and interpreted.
Section Analysis of digital traces describes the found digital
artifacts on Smart TV during this research, including traces
of social networking applications like Facebook and
Twitter. The screenshots the Smart TV makes from content
within a running application are valuable for a forensic
investigator to get a ﬁrst quick impression of user activity.
The forensic investigator can use the result of this paper
as a guide for performing a digital forensic investigation on
a Smart TV. This research shows that a Smart TV can
contain relevant digital data for forensic investigations and
therefore it should be a part of digital investigations. It also
describes multiple methods which are usable for acquiring
data on other embedded systems.
Future work
In this paper only one brand and model of Smart TV was
analysed. There are many different types and brands of
Smart TVs on the market. In order to get a better under-
standing of Smart TVs, other types also need to be exam-
ined. Only certain types of digital traces and mostly traces
that were easy to interpret were analysed. A deeper anal-
ysis of the Smart TV would reveal even more interesting
traces, for example the frequency of the creation of appli-
cation content screenshots and the longevity of said
screenshot ﬁles. It is also expected that there are a lot more
digital traces in the various types of Smart TV, as each
brand or model can contain different types of apps or have
different functionality which can leave behind different
digital traces.
The SamyGO rooting method will most probably only
work for a speciﬁc model and ﬁrmware. An alternative
method could be a triage type of application which copies
only important ﬁles from a Smart TV or makes a copy of the
Smart TV without altering the content.
Another important research point is internal volatile
memory of the Smart TV. The internal volatile memory
should also be acquired and analysed. Internal volatile
memory can contain very relevant information such as
passwords, last activity on the Smart TV, etc. More research
should be done in the ﬁeld of obtaining a memory dump of
a Smart TV.The ﬁve-wire method shouldn't be excluded in future
research, it may still be a viable method for other brands
and models Smart TV.
There is also research to be done on the network activity
of a Smart TV, be it by ethernet, wiﬁ or bluetooth. This is
interesting for cases where data interception is part of the
investigation.Acknowledgements
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